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Background

Europe and Czech national traditions
As Ghia Nodia suggests, contending geo-political and 'civilizational' alignments have been an integral part of the politics of most small Central and East European societies since at least the 19 th century and continue to be so today. 1 In the Czech case, despite the existence of a minority Slavophile tradition looking to Russia, the dominant alignment historically has been The 1992 Czech Constitution, hastily adopted during the months preceding the break-up of Czechoslovakia, made a limited, theoretical provision for referendums (and other forms of direct democracy) subject to the passing of a constitutional law (requiring a qualified majority). 20 In the mid-1990s, therefore, Czech law contained no provision of any kind for national referendums. voting. Despite the efforts of ODS legislators to insert one, unlike in neighbouring Poland and Slovakia, there was no minimum turnout requirement. 22 The referendum was to be officially called by the President within 30 days of the signature of the Treaty of Accession.
As in Czech parliamentary elections, voting was to take place over two days with the President determining the exact dates of polling. Any person entitled to vote was entitled submit legal objections to the validity of the referendum to the Czech Constitutional Court within ten days of the end of polling. If EU membership was rejected, the Law allowed for further accession referendums to be held. However, no referendum on EU accession on the same conditions as those rejected could be held for two years.
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The referendum campaign(s)
The Czech referendum campaign was initially overshadowed by the war in Iraq, but by midFebruary the accession referendum was becoming a dominant theme. 
29
Both the overall campaign strategy and individual aspects of the campaign were then put out to tender to private firms. The winning campaign strategy was devised by a non-profit organisation named 'European Integration', especially founded to bid for the campaign by a number of advertising professionals.
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The campaign, which began in mid-February after being formally approved by the cabinet, was largely based around conventional advertising. 40-45 per cent of its 200 million crown budget was set aside for TV, press and billboard advertising and the production of leaflets and other publicity materials -the campaign sought to ensure that a leaflet explaining accession was delivered to every Czech household. Publicity materials were also distributed with the final letter taking the form of the EU symbol -its goal was to deliver a vote for accession. 33 The campaign was timetabled into several phases: 1) a first phase concentrating on providing information concerning accession that citizens lacked; 2) a second phase (beginning in early May) stressing the benefits of EU membership; and 3) and a final two week long media-led drive to maximise turnout at the referendum itself and 4) a follow-up phase thanking voters for supporting accession. Campaigning in the national media centred around typical individual citizens from small-medium European states, which had joined the EU in previous enlargement waves, a strategy intended to humanise apparantly distant and anonymous European institutions. Billboard advertising featured a Portuguese fisherman, an
Austrian pensioner and a Spanish bus driver, TV advertising an Irish IT consultant, a Finnish manager and a Greek café owner. The campaign slogan was 'Welcome to the Community'.
However, the core of the campaign, particularly its printed materials and the regional and NGO projects and events, was to address the Czech public's concerns about the impact of accession on everyday life and stress the benefits it would bring ordinary people. 39 A particular concern was to reach difficultto-access-groups where concern over the impact of accession was highest and support for EU by the official information campaign, which stressed that the EU had a spiritual and moral dimension -an acknowledgement that some Christians had concerns that accession would promote moral permissiveness. 41 Despite its growing opposition to the governing coalition's austerity plans, in April the principal trade union federation (ČMKOS) launched its own pro-EU campaign, calling a series of regional meetings 42 and distributing an Employees' Guide to the EU to members. The Unions stressed that accession would lead to a growth in wages, purchasing power and productivity and ensure high standards of labour protection. 48 As the above suggests, the ODS accession 'campaign' was largely confined to internal party discussion and criticism of political opponents. It undertook virtually no organised national or regional campaigning directed at voters in connection with the referendum. 49 Most strikinglly, ODS failed to make any formal appeal to party supporters to vote 'Yes' until two hours before polling was due to begin on 13 June, when Jan Zahradil issued a press release urging them to do so on the grounds that the Czech Republic would be better able to defend its national interests from within the Union.
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ODS argued that it was unnecessary for the party to pro-accession campaign, given that the overwhelming majority of its supporters were known to favour EU membership. Moreover, it claimed, the pro-accession campaigners were missing the point that the form of the EU mattered far more than mere accession to it. The bombastic official 'Yes' campaign, it claimed, was wilfully obscuring both the costs and benefits of accession and the future of the Union. However, the growing trend towards the EU becoming 'a centralised European superstate' dominated by larger nations urgently required the formulation of a 'Czech policy' to assert and defend national interests. 51 The party, therefore, demanded that a second referendum should be held in 2004 over any proposed EU Constitution. 52 If such new arrangements were too federalist, Jan Zahradil suggested, ODS would not recommend its supporters to ratify them. 53 A
number of ODS figures, including its Interior and Trade spokespersons Ivan Langer and Martin Řiman one of the authors of its keynote 2001
Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism, Miloslav Bednář -who described a 'Yes' ballot as a 'ticket for the Titanic' -publicly opposed accession, 54 a divergence from party policy that its leader seemed to accept with equanimity.
President Klaus: 'No comment'
In his first weeks as President Klaus sent mixed signals regarding the EU. In early April on a visit to Poland, Klaus emphasised that he saw 'no alternative' path for the Czech Republic other than membership of the EU, given the country's geographical position. 55 He also insisted on his right as head of state to be one of the three Czech co-signatories of the Athens Treaty of Accession later the same month. However, other interventions by the new President were more controversial. Klaus continued to air his well-established 'eurorealist' stance on European integration. Klaus thus told Die Zeit, during an official visit to Germany, 'a marriage of convenience, not a love match', also expressing scepticism about the feasibility of a European foreign policy. 56 In an eve-of poll newspaper interview, he also repeated his doubts over the viability of both democracy above the level of the nation-state and the eurozone, criticised Czech intellectuals who, he claimed, saw EU membership as a panacea for all social and political ills and expressed regret that Czechs had not had longer to enjoy the national independence regained in 1989. 57 Klaus also re-engaged with the Beneš Decrees issue, conceding that they 'unacceptable from today's point of view', but refusing to contemplate compensation for or negotiations with Sudeten German groups. 58 He did not, however, link the issue to EU accession as he had done in the 2002 election campaign. 59 The President also repeatedly and publicly clashed with government politicians over European integration. His remarks to journalists after the Athens Treaty signing, that joining the EU involved a calculation of costs and benefits, one of the costs being loss of national sovereignty, provoked Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda to retort that, if given by a law student in an exam, the President's views would be failed. 60 Similarly rancorous exchanges were reported at the meeting of Czech party leaders called by Klaus to discuss accession in May.
He also publicly criticised the 'Yes' campaign for trivialising accession, failing to spur any serious debate and wasting public money. 61 More significantly, Klaus declined to publicly advocate a 'Yes' vote -or to say how he would be voting in the referendum, justifying his stance as necessary to underline the political neutrality of his office and confining himself simply to an appeal to citizens to vote in the referendum. anti-accession activities were was based upon grassroots activists, who distributed some 360, 000 leaflets. 67 In June the party also announced that it would mobilise members in every polling district in the country to act as election monitors in order to prevent 'manipulation' of the result. The campaign leaders' claim that they had distributed 20,000 leaflets in Prague, a city with a population of some one million, also indicates the limits of the campaign. Reports of other anti-EU events elsewhere in the Czech Republic in both mainstream media and on Czech anti-EU websites suggest that these were similarly scattered, small scale and few in number.
Despite differences of emphasis, reflecting the different ideological strands within the campaign, 73 its arguments against accession centred on three key points:
1) that the EU was a 'bureaucratic colossus', which would suffocate the Czech Republic with 'socialist' bureaucratic regulation -a point emphasised by the campaign logo, a hammer and sickle intertwined with the EU symbol;
2) that EU accession would mark an unacceptable loss of Czech national sovereignty, The campaign slogan, 'Welcome to the Community' was also criticised for implying that accession was a fait accompli. Some also argued that the absence of any effective 'No' voices, paradoxically, undermined the effectiveness of the 'Yes' campaign. 82 Moreover, analysis of polling data suggested that, despite superior planning, organisation and resources, the 'Yes' campaign was having relatively little impact on voters beyond creating an awareness that 'something was going on'. 83 Polling data also suggested that, despite the message of the 'Yes' campaign, large numbers of Czech voters still believed that accession would have a significant negative, short-term, economic impact on their lives. 84 Many, however, believed that they would be able to adjust to these changes -an expectation perhaps influenced by the relatively benign Czech experience of economic transition during the 1990s -and were therefore inclined to vote 'Yes' or not strongly inclined to vote 'No'. 85 The 'No' camp's lack of resources were aggravated by internal political divisions. As a wellresourced parliamentary party with significant local organisation and growing appeal, it was the Communists who, who appeared best placed to organise an effective 'No' campaign.
However, despite organising anti-EU events on the basis of party gatherings May 2003, the party failed to develop a broader campaign or use other media to build on its success in the June 2002 elections. Given that these party political events mainly attract its own members and sympathisers, it seems unlikely that KSČM's belated campaigning on EU accession reached beyond its own limited, core electorate. Its campaign also appears to have been weakened by a lack of strong central co-ordination, allowing local organisations, in some cases, to articulate a more radical and nationalistic message than that of the party's national leadership. 86 Despite its considerable resources and capacity for strategic planning, KSČM thus appears to have mounted only a belated token campaign against accession.
Notwithstanding its lack of resources and the fractiousness and mutual suspicion of the fringe groups within it, 87 the 'No' campaign's strategy appeared misconceived in a number of ways.
Firstly, as polls repeatedly showed, voters inclined to vote against accession were most concerned about the immediate negative economic impact of EU membership on prices and employment, than abstract concepts such as sovereignty or identity, which were at best a secondary concern. The use of anti-communism to frame the issue of accession was also arguably a strategic error, as many (potential) 'No' voters and activists were politically on the left, many being Communist supporters. Secondly, the 'No' campaign rapidly became sidetracked, focussing much of its energy and propaganda on the alleged unfairness of the official information campaign and its refusal to fund to 'No' campaigners. Finally, the campaign was also arguably discredited by the obvious extremism of some of its leading members.
František Červenka, for example, who headed the Citizens Against the EU movement, was reported as telling the Eurocritical Congress that joining the EU was treason and that members of the Czech Government would one day find themselves on trial for doing so. He also stated that European integration was the work of masonic lodges and the Socialist International intended to destroy European Christian civilisation through 'abortions, homosexual marriages, euthanasia and other perversions'. 88 
… or campaign side effects?
The political consensus on EU accession in the Czech Republic was not only less broad than in many other CEE states, but also shallower. This was evident in the campaign itself from the acrimonious public disputes amongst the Czech political elite, including divisions within both the Communists and the Civic Democrats, and in President Klaus's failure to publicly advocate a 'Yes' vote or to say how he would be voting in the referendum. Indeed, Klaus was the only heads of state of an accession state not to recommend a 'Yes' vote. It is important to note, however, that these disputes were, on the whole, disputes around accession, rather than about accession. They concerned issues such as the nature of the campaign, the costs and benefits of accession, the relative importance of accession and post-accession issues, and preferred model of integration, rather than accession itself, which was viewed as a fait accompli even by its notional opponents in the Communist Party. We might, therefore, hypothesise that, such elite level division would offer confused signals, suggesting that a side-effect of the campaign might be to further demobilise weakly committed voters, whose motivation to vote was already weakened by the uncompetitive nature of the referendum campaign and the predictability of the result. 89 It is noticeable that both the turnout (55. reform, European identity and EU accession is a complex one with considerable potential to vary. 90 However, it therefore seems most likely that political-cultural predisposition of most Czech voters to identify themselves as belonging in (Western) Europe coupled with the perception of EU membership as the logical next step on the path of post-communist modernisation was the most significant 'cue' followed, producing an effect similar to party political cueing on a known issue referenda in established democracies by simplifying and channelling political choices. 91 Whether such a pattern will hold for future EU-related referendums, however, remains an open question. 
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